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INTRODUCTION

Structured finance, although only a recent innovation, nonetheless is "becoming one of the dominant means of capital formation in the United States."l Also known as asset securitization, structured finance refers to an approach used to raise
capital
whereby income-producing [financial] assets . . . are pooled and
converted into capital market instruments. In a typical [structured] financing, a sponsor transfers a pool of [financial] assets to
a limited purpose entity, which in turn issues [in the capital
markets] non-redeemable debt obligations or equity securities
with debt-like characteristics ... Payment on the securities depends primarily on the cash flows generated by the pooled assets.2

Structured finance offers a company important advantages
over other approaches to raising capital. Transactions are arranged so that investors make their investment decisions by
focusing on the quality of specific financial assets3 of a companyinstead of looking to the company's overall financial
strength. Thus, businesses that could not easily raise funds
through traditional sources may be able to use securitization to

1 Investment Company Act Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided in connection
with the recent issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act or
1940) [hereinafter SEC Release].
2 Id. For an introduction to the principles underlying structured finance and
asset securitization, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF AssET SECURITIZATION (Practicing- Law Institute, 2d ed.
1993).
For an example of a large but fairly typical structured finance transaction,
see the discussion of the recent Sears credit card securitization in Asset Sales
Report, Feb. 8, 1993, at 1. Sears, Roebuck & Co. sold its credit card accounts
receivable (that is, Sears' right to payment from customers who charged their
purchases on a Sears' credit card) to a newly created master trust, which in
tum sold interests in these receivables to several newly·created limited purpose
corporations. The limited purpose corporations funded their purchase of the
interests by issuing up to $1.5 billion in commercial paper to investors in the
capital markets.
3 "Financial assets" are assets that by their terms are expected to convert
into cash within a finite period of time. Examples of financial assets include
leases, loans, mortgages, and trade accounts receivable.
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gain access to the capital markets. 4 Companies that already
could raise funds through traditional sources may be able to
use securitization to obtain funding on more advantageous
terms through lower interest rates5 or off-balance sheet structures. 6
Structured finance is expected to continue to grow in importance as a source of capital for companies.7 There is, however,
a practical limitation to structured finance. Companies below
investment grade,S and even investment grade companies engaged in publicly marketed transactions, must structure their
securitization transactions in a manner that protects investors
in the event of a subsequent bankruptcy. Perhaps the most
essential element of such a "bankruptcy-remote" structure is a

4 The capital markets are "markets where capital funds debt and equity
- are traded. Included are private placement sources of debt and equity as well
as organized markets and exchanges." JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN GoODMAN,
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INvEsTMENT TERMS 54 (3d ed. 1991).
5 Debt securities issued in the capital markets typically bear a lower interest rate than a bank financing. This is due partly to ratings by rating agencies,
see infra note 8, partly to the source of funds being a mix of institutional and
other investors, and partly to the ability of an investor in the capital markets
to freely trade the debt securities. Debt securities issued pursuant to a structured finance transaction further benefit from the source of payment being
separated from possible credit risks associated with the company.
6 An off-balance sheet structure refers to a company raising financing by
selling assets to a third party, which in turn issues debt securities in the
capital markets. Thus, the company's balance sheet will reflect an asset sale
and not the issuance of debt. Accordingly, the company's leverage (ratio of debt
to equity) will not be affected.
7 See, e.g., You Can Securitize Virtually Everything, Bus. WK., July 20,
1992, at 78. The SEC also recently adopted Rule 3a-7 under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 to relax an inadvertent restriction on the growth of these
transactions: "Rule 3a-7 [adopted by the SEC under the Investment Company
Act of 1940] removes an unnecessary and unintended barrier to the use of
structured financings in all sectors of the economy •.••" SEC Release, supra
note 1, at 83,499.
6 The term "investment grade" technically refers to the rating on a company's long-term debt securities given by independent rating agencies. An investment grade rating reflects a rating agency's prediction that the debt securities
will be paid on a timely basis. At the end of 1992, most medium-sized, or
"middle-market," companies either did not have ratings or were not rated
investment grade. At that time, even some larger companies, including virtually
all airlines and department stores, did not have investment grade ratings. See,
e.g., S.& P. Lowers Bond Ratings of the 3 Big Airlines to Junk, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 12, 1993, at Dl.
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"true sale" of financial assets from the company to the limited
purpose entity.9 Structuring an economically viable. transaction
as a true sale, however, has not always seemed feasible. For
this reason, structured financing has not expanded in any meaningful way to the significant middle-market.
This article introduces the concept of a "divisible interest," a
type of partial interest in financial assets, and explains how
this innovation can expand the structured finance market significantly while maintaining the true sale nature so critical in
structured financing. The divisible interest approach also can be
applied to pool financial assets from multiple companies into a
single securitization transaction, thereby catalyzing an expansion of the capital markets to now-excluded middle-market companies.
This article will first discuss the legal basis underlying structured finance, focusing on the importance of a "true sale" and
its determining criteria. The article will then introduce the
"divisible interest" concept and apply the true sale criteria to
divisible interests. In that analysis, the article will dispel the
unfounded perception that the transfer of only a partial interest
in a future payment stream cannot be a true sale for bankruptcy purposes. The article then analyzes the commercial applica,bility of a divisible interest in structuring a securitization
transaction. Finally, the article examines Section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code1o and Section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code and concludes that their cash collateral provisions are
not applicable to divisible interests.
To help the reader focus more concretely on the issues, this
article will use the example of a "future payment stream" as a
representative type of financial asset. Nonetheless, the conclusions reached will have general applicability to all types of financial assets. l l

See infra notes 12 to 18 and accompanying text. A "true sale" is one
will prevent the property being sold from becoming part of the seller's
bankruptcy estate in a bankruptcy subsequent to the sale.
10 11 U.S.C. § 363 [hereinafter 11 U.S.C. et seq. may be referred to as the
"Bankruptcy Code"].
11 To the extent the future payment stream in which an interest is being
sold is a general intangible under the U.C.C., it raises issues of general application that are beyond the scope of this article. Such issues include how to perfect
the sale, and whether the filing of U.C.C.-l financing statements is sufficient in
9

w~ich
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ANALYSIS

Importance of a True Sale

Before discussing the legal and economic consequences of
selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream, it is
necessary to explain the meaning of a "true sale." In many
structured financing transactions, a future payment stream is
legally separated from the company originating a right to ·receive payment for goods or services (known as the "originator").
That way, if the originator later becomes bankrupt, creditors of
the originator are unable to reach the future payment stream.
The future payment stream, in turn, is dedicated to payment of
the securities issued to investors in the capital markets.
To effect a sale of a future payment stream, the originator
normally transfers all its right, title, and interest in the future
payment stream to a' bankruptcy-remote third party. This
transfer should fully separate the future payment stream from
the originator entity. Sales that are effective against creditors
and the estate of a bankrupt originator, in that the property is
no longer "property of the debtor's estate" under Section 541 of
the Bankruptcy Code,12 are generally referred to as "true
sales.,,13 For originators that are below investment grade, or
that do not have investment grade ratings (which include most
middle-market companies, as well as hospitals),14 it is critical
light of U.C.C. § 9-102 and Official Comment No.2; whether contractual prohibitions on the sale of future payment streams are valid under U.C.C. § 9-318
and Official Comment No.4; and the issues relating to the sale of future intangibles described in note 36, infra. But see Permanent Editorial Study Board
Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Report Vol. I, part IIl.A.1, at
43 (Dec. 1, 1992) which recommended that "Articie 9 [of the U.C.C.] should be
revised to include within its scope sales of general intangibles for the payment
of money." Other issues of general application to the sale of a future payment
stream, such as tax treatment, also are beyond the" scope of this article.
12 11 U.S.C. § 541 (property of a debtor's estate). For a sale to be effective
against creditors as well, the sale must not constitute a fraudulent conveyance
under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or applicable state fraudulent transfer
laws. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 35-36.
13 The term "true sale" will have a different definition depending on the
field of law for which it is operative. The three principal areas of applicability
are accounting, tax, and bankruptcy. A given transfer of receivables may well
be a sale for certain purposes but not others. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at
28-29.
14 Because investment grade companies are regarded by the rating agencies
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to the success of a structUred financing transaction that the
transfer of the relevant future payment stream to the third
party constitutes a true sale. III
The third party to whom the future payment stream is sold
would be a bankruptcy-remote, limited purpose entity (referred
to as a special purpose vehicle or SPVI6 ). The SPV raises
funds to pay the purchase price for the future payment stream
to the originator by issuing debt securities (or securities having
debt-like characteristics) to investors in the capital markets.
Since these securities usually are rated as investment grade ()r
higher by nationally recognized rating agencies because of the
quality of the underlying financial assets, they can be traded in
the capital markets.17 Their ability to be tTaded not only attracts investors but also means that the mix of investors in a
given structured finance transaction may well change during
the life of the transaction.

as highly unlikely to go bankrupt, it is sometimes less critical in structuring a
securitization transaction to protect against the possibility of bankruptcy.
15 If the transfer of the future payment stream from the originator to the
third party fails to constitute a true sale under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code,
the transfer would be deemed an advance of funds by the third party to the
originator secured by the payment stream, i.e., a secured loan. The third party
would then be a creditor of the originator and have a security interest, but not
an ownership interest, in the payment stream. In such a case, the originator's
bankruptcy would, under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, automatically result in
a stay of all actions by creditors to foreclose on or otherwise obtain property of
the originator. The third party may not be able to obtain payments collected on
the payment stream until the stay is modified. Further, under § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code, a court, after notice to creditors and the opportunity of a
hearing, could order the cash collections of the payment stream to be used by
the originator in its business as working capital if the originator or its trustee
in bankruptcy provides adequate protection for the interest of the third party in
the payment stream. "Adequate protection," though, does not always translate
into an alternative cash source.
In addition, § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code also would permit the originator,
if credit is not otherwise available to it and if adequate protection is given to
the third party, to raise cash by granting to new lenders a lien that is either
pari passu with that of the third party or, if a pari passu lien cannot attract
new financing, a lien having priority over the third party's lien. See SCHWARCZ,
supra note 2, at 30.
18 Special purpo,se vehicles can be structured in many forms such as corporations, trusts, or partnerships. For a more complete discussion of the types of
SWs, the reasons for each type, and the importance of making the SPV "bankruptcy remote," see SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 16-27.
17 Such securities are known as "asset-backed securities."
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Whether the transfer of a future payment stream constitutes
a true sale under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code requires
case-by-case analysis. IS Although various courts have considered whether transfers of payment streams constitute a true
sale for bankruptcy purposes, the facts of the decided cases
have not been representative for the most part of modern structured finance transactions. Accordingly, the cases are not easily
harmonized, and readers can differ as to which factors are relevant and which are entitled to greater weight. Nonetheless, a
cluster of factors can be identified that are relevant in most
determinations of whether a given transfer of payment streams
is a sale or a secured loan. Each of these factors is indicative of
whether the originator truly parted with the future economic
risks and benefits of ownership of the payment stream purported to be sold, and whether the purported buyer has taken on
the risks and benefits of ownership.
1.

Recourse

The most significant factor in determining whether a transaction is a true sale or a secured loan appears to be the extent
and nature of the recourse that the transferee of the payment
stream has against the transferor. 19 The existence of some recourse in a sale agreement does not by itself preclude characterization of the transaction as a true sale.20 If recourse is
present, the issue is "whether the nature of the recourse, and
the true nature of the transaction, are such that the legal
rights and economic consequences of the agreement bear a
greater similarity to a financing transaction [a secured loan] or
to a sale."21

I

Portions of the following discussion of true sale criteria have been based
on SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 31-35, with permission of the author and publisher.
19 See, e.g., Majors Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538,
545 n.12 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that Grant Gilmore "placers] almost controlling
significance on the one factor of recourse"); see also 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURI- .
TY INTERESTS IN PERsONAL PROPERTY § 44.4, at 1230 (1965).
20 Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 544 (relying on U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt.
4); see also PETER F. COOGAN ET AL., 1C SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 28.03[4] (1992).
21 Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 544 (footnote omitted).
18
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In the leading case of Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp.,22 the court analyzed the recourse provisions in an accounts receivable financing agreement to determine whether the
transaction should be considered a sale or a secured loan. In
holding the transaction to be a secured loan, the court considered the risks that each party- assumed as well as the guaranties given by Major's as to the quality and the collectibility of
its accounts.23 Major's was required to give the following warranties: that its customers "meet the criteria set forth by Castle, that Major's perform the credit check to verify that these
criteria were satisfied, and that Major's warrant that the accounts were fully enforceable legally and were 'fully and timely
collectible. ,"24 Major's was also required to indemnify Castle for
any losses that resulted from "a customer's failure to pay, or for
any breach of warranty, and an obligation to repurchase any
account after the customer was in default for more than 60
days."25 The court concluded that "[g]uaranties of quality
alone, or even guarantees of collectibility alone, might be consistent with a true sale, but Castle attempted to shift; all risks
to Major's, and incur none of the risks or obligations of ownership. "28 This case is illustrative of the approach courts take in
determining the nature of the recourse in a particular transactic:m. 27
2.

Retained Rights and Right to Surplus

Perhaps the second most important factor indicating the existence of a secured transaction rather than a sale is the originator's right to redeem or repurchase a transferred payment
stream. For example, Section 9-506 of the Uniform Commercial

449 F. Supp. 538 (E.n.p.A. 1978), affd, 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979),
Id. at 543.
24Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. To the extent that the seller of a payment stream makes representations and warranties that are not continuing representations and warranties of
collectibility, but rather ones limited to the condition and characteristics of the
payment streams at the time they are sold, such warranties should be no
different than warranties ordinarily given by a seller of a product. See U.C.C.
§§ 2-312 to 2-315. Accordingly, such limited representations and warranties
should not be inconsistent with treatment of the transaction as a sale.
27 See, e.g., In re Joseph Kanner Hat Co., 482 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1973).
22

23
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Code and various state mortgage statutes allow a debtor to
redeem property before a secured party ultimately disposes of
it.28 The absence of a right of redemption or repurchase would
be a factor in favor of characterization of the structured finance
transaction as a true sale.
Several courts also have considered the existence of a transferor's right to any surplus collections, once the transferee has
collected its investment plus an agreed yield, as indicative of a
secured' loan.29 The right of the SPV to retain collections for
its own account, even after the SPV has collected its investment plus yield, therefore would be a factor in favor of characterization of the structured finance transaction as a true sale.
3.

Pricing Mechanism

Pricing based upon a fluctuating interest index of the type
found in commercial loan 'agreements, such as the prime or
base rate, may be indicative of a secured loan. The pricing mechanism also may be indicative of a secured loan to the extent
the purchase price is retroactively adjusted to reflect actual
rather than expected collections on payment streams.30
In the closest approach to a true sale, the SPV would purchase a future payment stream on a discounted basis. The discount would be calculated or negotiated prior to each purchase,
in part based on the SPV's then net current cost of funds and
the anticipated collection and loss experience of the payment
stream then to be purchased. Once a discount has been negotiated for each purchase, it could not thereafter be adjusted for
that purchase, regardless of differences between the actual and
anticipated costs of funds and of collection experience. Such
fixed pricing would be a factor in favor of characterization of
the structured finance transaction as a true sale.

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-506 (Supp. 1992).
See, e.g., In re Nixon Mach. Co., 6 B.R. 847, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1980); Evergrelln Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659, 661-62 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982);
In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp., 19 B.R. 609, 617 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982),
relJ'd on other grounds, 763 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1985).
30 See Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 U.S. 568 (1916); Dorothy v.
Commonwealth Commercial Co., 116 N.E. 143 (lll. 1917).
28
29
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Administration and Collection of Accounts

The administration of and control over the collection of the
payment stream are factors courts sometime cite in resolving
the sale/secured loan issue.31 In the strongest example of a
true . sale of a payment stream, the SPY should have the authority to control collection of the payments.32 Examples of
such authority would' include: (1) the SPV's ownership of all
books, records, and computer tapes relating to the payment
stream, and (2) the SPV's having the right (a) to control the
activities of the collection agent for the payment stream and at
any time to appoint another collection agent, (b) to establish a
credit and collection policy for the payment stream, and (c) at
any time to notify the persons obligated to make the payments
that the payment stream has been sold.
In practice, the originator often is ~ppointed as the collection
agent. That is not necessarily inconsistent with characterization
as a sale if: (1) the originator will be acting as an agent for the
SPY pursuant to established standards, much like any other
collection agent; (2) the originator will receive a collection agent
fee that represents an arm's-length fee for those services; and
(3) the SPY has the right at any time to appoint itself or another person as collection agent in place of the originator.33
Sometimes collections of the payment stream are paid to the
originator as collection agent and commingled, or mixed, with
the originator's general funds. This frequently occurs when the
originator receives collections from the payment stream each
day, but remits the collections periodically (e.g., monthly) to the
SPY. Besides raising a potential perfection question under the
UCC,34 commingling might raise a question whether a sale
was intended if the originator is permitted to use collections
that belong to the SPY. That inconsistency often can be addressed by the originator's segregating and holding the collections
in trust pending remittance to the SPY or periodic reinvestment.

31 One interesting discussion of this question occurs in the British case,
Lloyds & Scottish Fin. Ltd. v. Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd., House of Lords, 29
Mar. 1979 (LEXIS, English General Library, Cases File).
32 People v. Service Inst., Inc., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
33 See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 34.
34 See discussion infra part II.C.
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There are also a variety of miscellaneous factors that do not
fall within the categories discussed above, but that may be
indicative of a secured loan.35
B.

Applying the True Sale Criteria to Divisible Interests

In order to apply the foregoing true sale criteria to the sale
of a divisible interest in a future payment stream, it is necessary to define a "divisible interest." A divisible interest is any
interest in a future payment stream that (1) is less than all of
the originator's right, title, and interest in the payment stream
and (2) can be measured. clearly so that the originator and the
SPV will have no valid basis to dispute how collections (once
received) are to be divided. References to the sale of a divisible
interest in a future payment stream are intended to mean the
sale of a divisible interest in an existing right to future payment as well as the sale of a divisible interest in collections. It
is important to sell the right to an intangible asset and not
only the proceeds of such asset once such proceeds are later
collected.3s

35 These factors are: (1) the originator of the payment stream is a debtor of
the SPV on or before the purchase date; (2) the SPV's rights in the payment
stream can be extinguished by payments or repurchases by the originator or by
payments from sources other than collections on the payment stream; (3) the
originator is obligated to pay the SPV's costs (including attorney fees) incurred
in collecting delinquent or uncollectible payments; (4) the language of the documentation contains references to the transfer being "security for" a debt; and (5)
the parties' intent, as evidenced by the documentation and their actions, suggests that the parties view the transaction as a security device. Also of importance is how the parties account for the transactions on their books, records,
and tax returns. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 34-35.
35 There are two reasons why it may not be feasible to sell an interest in
future payments under a contract not yet in existence. First, the common law
governing the sale of intangibles is ambiguous as to the effectiveness of the sale
of an intangible asset that does not exist on the date of its purported sale.
Compare New York Security and Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas and Electric Co., 53
N.E. 758 (N.Y. 1899) (purchaser of accounts must ensure that the subject
matter of accounts involves a right existing at the time of assignment in order
to protect its interest from general creditors) with Rockmore v. Lehman, 128
F.2d 564 (2d Cir.) rev'd on reh'g, 129 F.2d 892, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1942)
(assignment of account which arose from contract already in existence was a
legal assignment with priority over prior or subsequent equitable claims and
over subsequent lien creditors in a court of law). Second, under § 552 of the
Bankruptcy Code, assets that are acquired by a debtor after a bankruptcy
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The particular example of a divisible interest discussed in
this article is an interest in the future payment stream equal
to 100 percent of collections up to a" negotiated amount (the
"trigger point") and a fixed percentage (the "fixed percentage")
of collections above the trigger point. This is not necessarily the
only way a divisible interest can be structured, but merely the
author's suggestion of a potentially useful structure.
There has been an unfounded perception that the transfer of
only a partial interest in a future payment stream (as opposed
to transfer of the entire payment stream) cannot be a true sale
for bankruptcy purposes. Part of the confusion may be semantic. The transfer of au of a person's right, title, and interest in
an asset to another person is the very defmition of a sale of
such asset. 37 Yet a divisible interest has been defined as less
than all of the originator's right, title and interest in the relevant payment streamI This apparent dilemma is resolved by
recognizing that what is being sold is all of the originator's
right, title, and interest in a divisible interest in the payment
stream, as opposed to all of the originator's right, title, and
interest in the entire payment stream.
At least one court has held that the assignment of a partial
interest in a future payment transfers full legal title in that
interest to the assignee. In Angeles Real Estate Co. v. Kerxton,38 one-half of the proceeds of a note was assigned by a
construction company as payment for a prior debt. 39 When the
construction company was adjudicated bankrupt, the assignee
sued the trustee of the bankruptcy estate for one-half of the

petition is flIed may not be subject to a pre-bankruptcy security interest except
to the extent that such assets are proceeds of property pledged prior to bankruptcy.
It would be feasible to sell an interest (divisible or otherwise) in the right to
future payments arising from existing trade accounts receivable or even consisting of the right to payments that are expected to come due in the future under
an existing contract (indeed, there is authority that one may assign a future
right to payment under an existing contract even if services giving rise to the
payment obligation under such contract have not yet been p"erformed) United
Va. Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188 (4th.
Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986); See SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 9 n.9 &
37-39; cf. U.C.C. § 9-204 (security interests in after-acquired property).
37 See supra text accompanying note 13.
'
38 737 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1984).
39 Id. at 418.
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proceeds that had been collected on the note. The Fourth Circuit held that the assignee had a superior claim to half of the
proceeds since the partial assignment transferred legal title to
the assignee. In rejecting the trustee's contention that "a partial
assignment does not create a legal interest in the assignee unless the debtor [i.e., the person obligated to make the payment]
consents to the assignment," the court reasoned first, that
"[h]ere there is no question of prejudicing the obligor on the
note," and second, that Section 326 of the Restatement Second
of Contracts provides that an "'assignment of a part of a right
[, whether the part is specified as a fraction, as an amount, or
otherwise,] is operative as to that part to the same extent and
in the same manner as if the part had been a separate
right.'n40 Under the logic of the Angeles Real Estate Co. case,
an originator's sale of a divisible interest in a future payment
stream will effectively separate that interest from the originator
entity in the event of a subsequent bankruptcy.41
40 Id. at 419 (quoting Restatement Second of Contracts § 326(1) (1981);
bracketed language appears in § 326(1) but was omitted from the quotation
cited by the court).
41 The law arising from the sale of loan participations is also instructive. A
loan participation is an undivided interest in a loan. The bank that made the
loan sells the participation to another bank, thereby diversifying the lending
bank's credit risk. See, e.g., Reade H. Ryan, Jr., Participations in Loans under
New York Law, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Oct. 1984 at 40.
In the leading case on the characterization of a loan participation as a true
sale, FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California, 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967), San
Francisco National Bank ("SFNB") sold to Union Bank an 80% interest in a
loan. SFNB subsequently was declared insolvent and taken over by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, as Receiver. After SFNB's takeover, SFNB
received a substantial payment on its loan through a set-off. Union Bank asserted a preferred claim to 80% of that payment. 379 F.2d at 664. The court
would have given Union Bank a preferred claim, as opposed to merely a distribution of SFNB's assets pro rata with other creditors, if "the property is not
that of [SFNB] but that of the claimant [Union Bank]." 379 F.2d at 664.
The court acknowledged the general rule that "[a]n assignment of payments
to be made in futuro ..• is held to pass legal title in the proceeds to the assignee." 379 F.2d at 665. The court further stated that "[i]f Mademoiselle [the
borrower] had made a specific payment on the note in the amount now claimed
by Union [Bank], this case would come within [the foregoing] rule," thereby
recognizing that the sale of an undivided interest in a loan can constitute a
true sale. Ido Nonetheless, the court held that Union Bank did not have a
preferred claim based on the narrow (and this author believes, archaic) ground
that the payment occurred through a set-off and a set-off does not aUgIl).ent the
assets of SFNB or its receiver. Id. Mademoiselle nevertheless establishes the
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Commercial Application

Selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream can
have significant commercial importance. The right to receive
future payments from obligors is an intangible that may not be
easily divisible until cash collections actually are received.
Therefore, the ability to sell a divisible interest, prior to collections being received, would afford significant flexibility to originators. This is evident, by way of example, where the future
payment stream is due from a limited number of obligors, such
as lessees on a few long-term leases. Even where the future
payment stream is due from a large number of obligors, such
rule that a participation can create a true sale. See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group Inc., 113 B.R. 830, 842 n.15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("In Ma·
de1TUJiselle, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged with approbation the general rule
that a loan participation passes legal title in the proceeds of the fund to the
participant.")
The Made1TUJiselle case can be contrasted with another leading case on the
sale of loan participations, In re Yale Express System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 790
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). First National City Bank ("FNCB") made a loan to Yale Express, and then sold a 40% participation in that loan to Marine Midland Trust
Company of New York ("Marine"). Yale Express subsequently went bankrupt.
The issue before the court was whether Marine was a creditor of Yale Express
and therefore could have set off against a bank account of Yale Express. IT the
sale of the participation made Marine an owner of 40% of the loan, the set-off
would have been permitted.
The court ruled, however, that "Marine was not and is not a creditor entitled
to set off the bank account." 245 F. Supp. at 792. Although the court does not
discuss its reasoning, it is apparent from the facts specifically noted by the
court that the true sale determination was based on the type of general factors
discussed in part II.A of this article and not on the undivided' nature of the
participation per se:
[Marine's] right to repayment would arise only upon the receipt by FNCB
of payment from Yale [Express]. All rights to extend or amend the Bubstantial terms of the credit agreement were lodged solely with FNCB.
Upon any default by Yale, FNCB alone had the power to act respecting
such default or defaults. In addition, FNCB had the option to repurchase
Marine's stipulated participation interest.
245 F. Supp. at 792.
IT the participation agreement in the Yale Express case did not give FNCB
the option to repurchase Marine's interest, if it did not provide that Marine's
right to repayment would arise only upon FNCB's receipt of payment from Yale
Express, and if Marine had some degree of control over amendments. to and
enforcement of remedies under the credit agreement, this writer believes the
court would have held the participation to be a true sale and therefore permitted the set-off.
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as buyers of goods who are obligated to pay trade receivables,
an originator's ability to sell a divisible interest still would
afford significant flexibility over more traditional pooling. The
originator may have operational difficulties, for example, in
segregating smaller pools of receivables and tracing proceeds of
their collections. Selling a divisible interest can obviate the
originator's need to do that and a host of similar problems.
Selling a divisible interest also can provide a simplified and
less cumbersome transactional structure. At present, many middle-market companies, because they lack an investment grade
rating, cannot gain direct access to the capital markets. In order to gain access to the capital markets through securitization,
these companies presently would have to engage in a somewhat
cumbersome structure, involving a true sale to a newly created
bankruptcy-remote subsidiary and a second sale transaction
between the subsidiary and an SPY that would issue securities
in the capital markets. 42 The costs involved in creating a twostep structure prevent it, however, from being economically
viable for the relatively small level of future payment streams
originated by a typical middle-market company.
Although it would be desirable to avoid the need for a twostep structure, an economically viable true sale from the originator to the SPY is difficult to achieve. There is a tension between the originator - which wants to maximize the purchase
price it receives for selling the future payment stream - and
the SPY - which wants to minimize the purchase price. The
excess of the amount of the future payment stream over the
purchase price is referred to as "over-collateralization." The
higher the over-collateralization, the more the SPY (and investors in its securities) are protected from losses but the less
attractive the transaction is to the originator.43 A two-step

~2 This structure is known as a "FINCO" or "two-tier" structure. The future
payment stream is partly sold and partly transferred as a capital contribution
to a newly created, bankruptcy-remote subsidiary of the originator. When the
capital market securities eventually are paid, the originator regains the benefit
of any excess collections remaining in the subsidiary by causing the subsidiary
to dividend the excess to the originator or by merging the subsidiary into the
originator. For a general discussion of the FINCO structure, see sCHW~Z,
supra note 2, at 21-22.
~3 Consider, for example, a true sale of a one million dollar future payment
stream to an SPV. The originator would want to be paid one million dollars
upon the sale of the future payment stream, discounted only for the SPV's cost
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structure (see supra note 42) could· permit the originator to
regain the benefit of excess collections, but it is a cumbersome
and expensive solution.
By selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream,
however, t~e two-step structure is rendered unnecessary. As
will be shown in an example below, the amount paid by an
Spy to purchase a divisible interest would equal only a portion
of the future payment stream. The divisible interest is structured, however, so the SPY will receive all collections of the
payment stream up to the trigger point (and perhaps a fixed
percentage of collections thereafter). The practical effect is that
the SPY (and its investors) will have a high degree of protec~
tion from loss while the originator retains all or most of the
benefit of collections above the trigger point.
Perhaps of even greater commercial importance is the potential for multiple companies to sell divisible interests in their
future payment streams as part of a single securitization transaction. At present, the level of future payment streams generated by a single middle-market company rarely would be suffi~
cient to justify the underwriting and related costs in selling an
SPV's securities to investors in the capital markets. A possible
solution would be to pool multiple originators in a single financing, and thereby achieve an economy of scale. Present "true
sale" structures, however, do not easily accommodate themselves to the pooling of multiple originators. In the two-tier
structure, for example, the originator sells the future payment
stream to a wholly owned, bankruptcy-remote SPY. If there are
niultiple originators, each originator would have to own shares
or other interests in the SPY and agree how the SPV's assets
and income are to be divided.
By using the concept of a divisible interest, however, multiple originators could join together to sell their future payment
streams to a single SPY, which would issue securities to inves-

of funds until the future payments are expected to be collected, suggesting, say,
980,000 dollars as a purchase price. The SPV, however, also would want to
guard against possible losses (as well as the risk that payments may be delayed
- see infra note 55) and may counter-offer with 900,000 dollars as a proposed
purchase price. If the originator believes that future payments will be made
without losses, it may well regard 900,000 dollars as too low a price because
the SPV would become the owner of the entire payment stream, including all
collections above 900,000 dollars.
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tors in the capital markets based on the combined pool of future payments. Because each originator's sale would stand on
its own, the complexities of a joint venture are avoided. The
costs of underwriting and selling the SPV's securities thereby
can be made economically viable.
2.

Example of a True Sale of a Divisible Interest

It may be useful to illustrate a sale of a divisible interest in
a future payment stream. In considering how to structure the
following example, an attempt has been made to balance, in a
manner that will be consistent both with a true sale and commercial acceptability, the SPV's desire to minimize the collection risk associated with each purchase and the originator's
competing desire that the interest in the payment streams sold
does not give the SPV a windfall.
The example chosen is a structured financing for a company
that originates payment streams in the form of receivables owing from third parties for goods sold and services rendered,44
and from time to time sells divisible interests in these receivables to an SPV. The question is whether the transfer of these
divisible interests can be structured as a true sale.
Assume for a given batch of receivables in which an interest
is to be sold that the net outstanding balance at the time of
sale is $1,000,000. Also assume that the SPV agrees to buy a
divisible interest in the receivables, measured as follows, for a
purchase price of $700,000:45

44 Virtually any type of originator could have been used as an example. For
example, the originator could be a hospital that originates payment streams in
the form of receivables for healthcare services rendered (owing from patients
and related governmental and private insurers).
45 The purchase prIce of $700,000 used in the example could well have been
$600,000, or $900,000, or even $500,000. It and the trigger point are arms'
length negotiated numbers. If, for example, the purchase price were negotiated
to be $500,000, the trigger point might be expected to be negotiated in the
order of magnitude of $515,000. The lower the purchase price compared to the
amount of the future payment stream, the less is the SPV's risk of collections
not reaching the trigger point. While theoretically any negotiated purchase price
and trigger point would be consistent with a true sale for the reasons discussed
in the text accompanying notes 48-49, at some point the purchase price may be
so low compared to the amount of the payment stream that it would violate the
"smell test" and be considered a secured loan rather than a true sale.
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(i) 100 percent of all collections up to a "bigger point," and
(il) a fixed percentage of all collections above the trigger

point.
The trigger point and the fixed percentage would be negotiated at the time of the purchase, and thereafter would remain
fixed. In negotiating' the trigger point, the SPV will want to
select a number that reflects its best estimate of the minimum
collections that will ensure repayment of its purchase price and
a desirable return on the investment represented by its purchase price. The originator, by contrast, will want the trigger
point to be as low as possible. In negotiating the fixed percentage, the SPV will want a number that provides an extra source
of compensation for taking a risk on fixing the amount of the
trigger point and the collection risk. 46 The originator, again,
will prefer the percentage to be as low as possible.
Assume that the negotiated trigger point was $720,000 and
the negotiated fixed percentage was three percent. Further assume that the collections on the receivables later tum out to be
$980,000.47 One then would compute the following numbers:

~8 The divisible interest equally well could have been structured without a
fixed percentage. The SPV, in that case, only buys an interest in the receivables
measured by 100% of all collections up to the trigger point.
47 Collections on each batch of receivables sold would be separately tracked.
From the standpoint of a true sale, each transfer of a divisible interest in a
batch would be independent of each other such transfer. This sometimes is
referred to as the transfers not being "cross-collateralized." Nonetheless, to the
extent the originator makes limited representations and warranties consistent
with a true sale, see supra note 26 and accompanying text, there is no logical
reason why the originator could not cross-collateralize an indemnification obligation for breach of such representations and warranties by pledging all of its
assets, which would include the originator's retained interest in each batch of
receivables. For example, in a securitization of a middle-market company that,
perhaps, might not have completely reliable records as to its future payment
streams, the SPV could be indemnified for reliance on inaccurate records, and
this indemnity could (if desirable) be secured by all of the company's assets.
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= $720,000.

= $980,000 - $720,000.
= $260,000.

=

3% x $260,000

= $7,800.

Therefore, for a purchase price of $700,000, the SPV would receive a return of $727,800.
Applying the factors discussed above, the transfer of the divisible interest in this illustration constitutes a true sale under
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. The SPV has assumed the
benefits and burdens of ownership of the divisible interest it
has purchased. If the amount of the divisible interest, calculated by applying the negotiated trigger point and fixed percentage to actual collections, is insufficient to repay the SPV's purchase price plus its applicable cost of capital, the SPV suffers a
loss. The SPV, however, will benefit to the extent that collections received exceed its investment and cost of funds.48 The
pricing formula is, effectively, a discount and has no semblance
of loan-type pricing. Also, because the trigger point and the
fixed percentage are negotiated prior to each sale of a divisible
interest, there is no retroactive adjustment of the purchase
price based on the amount of actual collections or the timing of
collections.49

.8 The SPV will receive the amount, if any, by which the trigger point is in
excess of its purchase price and return on investment. The SPV also will receive its negotiated fixed percentage of all collections above the trigger point,
although a transaction structured without entitling the SPV to collections above
the trigger point would still have enough potential benefit to constitute a true
sale. See infra note 55.
• 9 The foregoing example might be contrasted "with an approach, sometimes
seen, of the originator selling the entire payment stream to a buyer in return
for which the buyer pays its purchase price partly in cash and partly by giving
the originator an undivided interest (or "participation") in future collections of
the payment stream. At least where the buyer is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
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Consequently, the only true sale issue that can be raised in
the foregoing transaction is whether, because the SPY is receiving 100 percent of the first dollars collected up to the trigger
point, there may be excessive recourse. This is not, however,
the type of recourse that is inconsistent with a true sale. The
nature of the recourse in this transaction is such that the legal
rights and economic consequences are those of a true sale and
not a secured loan.
The type of transaction that is inconsistent with a true sale
occurs where the SPV's recourse against the originator (or its
assets) is subject to adjustment to ensure that the SPY receives
its original investment plus an agreed upon return on the investment.50 The originator then would receive all collections in
excess of the foregoing amounts. 51 Recourse of this nature will
be referred to as "adjustable recourse."
Adjustable recourse is inconsistent with a sale because the
adjustment changes the benefits and burdens of a sale to those
of a secured loan. The benefits and burdens of a sale are that
the buyer enjoys the benefit of any increase in value of the
asset purchased and bears the burden of any loss in value.52
The benefits and burdens of a secured loan are that the lender
is entitled only to repayment of the amount of its loan plus
interest at an agreed upon rate; and the borrower is entitled,
as a matter of law,53 to the return of any remaining collateral.

the originator in a FINCO structure, this raises an issue whether the originator
is truly entering into an arms' length negotiated sale. To achieve a sale, the
probability that the originator will be repaid on its participation must be sufficiently high to induce an independent seller of the payment stream in an arms'
length market transaction to take the participation as partial payment.
60 In Major's Furniture Mart v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d
Cir. 1979), the purported purchaser of the receivables. unilaterally changed the
discount from time to time to reflect the prime rate. Due to such changes, coupled with full recourse against Major's, the court held that transaction to be a
secured loan. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
61 Compare U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (secured party's right to dispose of collateral
after default) ("If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured
party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless agreed, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction was a sale
of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for
any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides.").
62 Rexnord, Inc. v. U.S., 940 F.2d 1094, 1098 (7th Cir. 1991).
63 See supra note 51.
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Even if the SPV in this example were virtually assured of
receiving collections up to the trigger point (because it receives
100 percent of the first dollars collected),54 its benefits and
burdens are still those of a buyer. The SPV takes the risk that
collections may be slower than originally anticipated and the
trigger point therefore may be too low to give the SPV a satisfactory return on its investment, as well as the risk that collections are insufficient even to reach the trigger point. But because the SPV is entitled to receive all collections up to the
trigger point (and is not limited to an agreed upon rate of return), if the actual rate of collection turns out to be higher
than originally anticipated the SPV will benefit from a greater
return on its investment.55 It is this potential for both gain
and loss on its investment, due to the fixed nature of the divisible interest, that makes the SPV's recourse consistent with a

54 A13 previously discussed, however, the trigger point would be fixed by
negotiation between the SPV and the originator prior to the sale of the divisible
interest. A rational originator would not be expected under ordinary circumstances to agree to too high a trigger point because the SPV benefits from all
collections up to the trigger point.
55 A numerical example perhaps would be helpful. If the $720,000 trigger
point in the example discussed in the text accompanying notes 45-48 is collected
in an average of six months, the SPV's effective rate of return, assuming simple
interest, on its $700,000 investment would be:
$20.000
6/12 = 5.7%.
$700,000
If, however, the $720,000 trigger point were collected in an average of two
months, the SPV's effective rate of return would be
$20.000
2112 = 17.1%.
$700,000
On the other hand, if the originator becomes troubled and collections are
delayed to an average of, say, nine months, the SPV's effective rate of return
would be as little as
$20.000
9/12 = 3.8%.
$700,000
The SPV therefore is subject to significant variation of its return on investment. Because a significant disparity between the anticipated and the actual
collection rate can significantly affect the economics of the transaction, the sale
of a divisible interest would appear to have its greatest practical application to
short term payment streams, such as trade receivables, retail credit card receivables and the like, where the collection rate can be predicted with greater accuracy. Certain items relating to the unique characteristics of the payment
stream, such as dilution, may (in appropriate cases) be able to be covered by a
specific indemnity without impairing true sale treatment. Cf. notes 26 and 47,
supra.
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true sale.56
C.

After a True Sale, Could the SPV's Divisible Interest in
Commingled Cash Collections be Impaired?

Two theories threaten to impair an SPV's divisible interest in
cash collections that have been commingled with cash collections of the originator's retained interest in the future payment
stream. The first theory is that, in the event of the originator's
bankruptcy, cash collections of the divisible interest would constitute "cash collateral" and therefore be subject to Section 363
of the Bankruptcy Code.57 The second theory is that to the
extent cash collections are commingled with the originator's
interest in the same payment stream, Section 9-306 of the
U.C.C. limits the SPV's interest in the collections.58 Neither
theory should apply to cash collections of a divisible interest.

56 A similar analysis is used to determine the statU8 of a production payment in the oil and gas and mineral industries. A production payment is the
right to share (normally a specified percentage) minerals produced from described property, free of the costs of production and terminating when a specified quantity or dollar amount has been realized. See Alamo Nat'! Bank of San
Antonio v. Hurd, 485 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); see also 2 HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, On. AND GAS LAw § 422 (1992). If the owner
of the property on which the oil, gas or minerals are located mes for bankruptcy, it becomes important to characterize the interest held by the recipient of
the production payment in the bankruptcy proceeding.
As in the sale of a divisible interest, a production payment "imposes no
personal obligation to pay the sum of money specified in the instrument creating it and no duty to deliver the agreed number of units of production apart
from actual production from the described premises." Id. § 422.2 at 373. The
right to receive payment does not arise until the oil, gas or minerals are produced. Id. The recipient of the production payment therefore has assumed all
the risks and benefits of ownership. "If, however, the payment is required to be
made whether or not the production is obtained or is sufficient for the purpose,
there is no true [production] payment; instead there is a debtor-creditor relationship and a lien or other security interest in production" because there is no
indicia of ownership. Id. § 422.2 at 374' (footnote omitted).
67 11 U.S.C. § 363.
56 For a detailed discussion of commingling under U.C.C. § 9-306, see
SCHWARCZ, supra note 2, at 40-41.
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Cash Collateral under Bankruptcy Law

Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code defines procedures for
allocating cash and cash equivalents in which both the debtor
(i.e., the originator) and a third party (i.e., the SPV) share an
interest. If cash collections of a divisible interest constitute
"cash collateral," the procedures of Section 363 would have to
be followed in allocating the collections. These procedures, if
applicable, could hinder the SPV's distribution of cash collections to its security holders. 59
Cash collateral is defined as
cash, .. , deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents ... in
which the [debtor's] estate and an entity other than the [debtor's]
estate have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property subject to a security interest
as provided in section 552(b) of [the Bankruptcy Code], whether
existing before or after the commencement of a [bankruptcy]
case.so

Cash collateral therefore would include cash collections of property owned by a debtor in which a third party has a security
interest. The debtor's ownership interest and the third party's
security interest constitute overlapping and competing interests
in the same property.S1
Does the term "cash collateral" also include cash collections
of a divisible interest in a payment stream sold to an SPV?
Resolution of this question turns on whether an originator, in
bankruptcy, and an SPV both "have an interesf' in these collections. The following analysis will consider, first, the divisible
interest to the extent it constitutes an interest in 100 percent

L9 Even if collections of the divisible interest are required to be paid to the
SPY, a delay might result in the investors in the SPY's securities not being
paid principal or interest on a timely basis, which could impair the investment
grade rating of the securities.
60 11 U.S.C. § 363(a).
61 Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code prevents the debtor from using cash
collections without affording the third party a court hearing at which the third
party's security interest would be adequately protected. "Adequate protection,"
however, may be inadequate from the standpoint of the third party to the
extent non-cash collateral is substituted for cash and cash equivalents. 11
U.S.C. §§ 363(c)(2), 363(e), 361.
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of collections of the future payment stream up to the trigger
point; and, second, the divisible interest to the extent it constitutes a fractional undivided interest (represented by the fixed
percentage) in collections above the trigger point.
The sale of the divisible interest to the SPV has been shown
to be a true sale under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.62
The originator therefore cannot have an ownership interest in
cash collections of the divisible interest up to the trigger point
because the SPV owns 100 percent of such collections (and the
SPV has not granted to the originator a security interest or any
other type of interest in the collections). Because the originator
has no interest in these collections, the term "cash collateral"
should not include cash collections of a divisible interest up to
the trigger point. Accordingly, such collections should not be
subject to the procedures set forth in Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The analysis of whether the term "cash collateral" includes
cash collections of a divisible interest above the trigger point is
more complicated because both the originator and the SPV own
a fractional undivided interest in the collections. If, for example, the SPV's fixed percentage is three percent and the amount
of collections above the trigger point is $260,000, the SPV
would be entitled to $7,800, and the originator would be entitled to $252,200. Even though the SPV's interest is an ownership and not a security interest, the definition of "cash collateral" refers to "an interest»63 and therefore could be interpreted
broadly to include both types of interests.
If the SPV's ~wnership interest in collections above the trigger point did constitute "cash collateral" under Section 363(a), a
court nonetheless should be required to allocate cash collections
to the SPV and not permit the originator to use the cash.64
Subsections 363(h) and G) contemplate a debto~ and a third
party having co-ownership undivided interests in property represented by a tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by
the entirety.65 The debtor is permitted, in these limited circumstances,56 to sell the third party's co-ownership interest,
See supra notes 44 to 56 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 60.
64 Cf. supra note 61 (regarding a debtor's right to use cash collateral by
providing "adequate protection").
65 11 U.S.C. § 363(h).
66 Because courts have wanted to limit the right of debtors to sell co-owner62

63
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but "the proceeds of such sale" are required to be "distribute[d]
to the . . . co-owners of such property . . . and to the [debtor]
. . . according to the interests of such . . . co-owners and of the
[debtor].n67 Therefore, when a co-ownership interest is reduced
to cash, there appears to be a legislative intent to distribute
the cash to the co-owners (i.e., the SPV and the originator)
according to their respective interests.68
It is also possible that a divisible interest itself may constitute a tenancy in common under state law. A tenancy in common can exist in relation to every type of property, including
personal property such as a future payment stream.69 The
originator need not intend the sale of the divisible interest to
constitute a tenancy in common; the sale of an interest that is
undivided, in and of itself, may create the tenancy in common. 70 If the divisible interest were to constitute a tenancy in
common under state law, Section 363(j) explicitly would require
the cash collections of the divisible interest to be distributed to
the originator and the SPV according to their respective interests.71
2.

Commingling under Commercial Law

If the originator goes bankrupt when cash collections of the
divisible interest and the originator's retained interest are commingled, could Section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code
limit the SPV's perfected interest in these collections? Where an
originator sells a divisible interest in a future payment stream

ship interests held by third parties, they have construed § 363(h) narrowly. See,
e.g., In re Livingston, 804 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1986).
67 11 U.S.C. § 363(j).
68 Because even a delay in the distribution of collections could impair the
investment grade rating on the SPY's securities (see supra note 59), a party
seeking to avoid any risk of delay could structure the transaction so that the
cash cQIlections up to the trigger point are sufficient to pay the SPY's securities
or simply eliminate the SPY's right to a fixed percentage of collections above
the trigger point.
69 See, e.g., Kellum v. Williams, 39 So.2d 573 (Ala. 1949); 20 AM. JUR. 2D
Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 25 (1965).
70 See, e.g., Dressler v. Mulhern, 136 N.Y.S. 1049 (1912); Lutz v. Dutmer,
282 N.W. 431 (Mich. 1938); Green v. Cannady, 57 S.E. 832 (S.C. 1907); 20 AM.
JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 28 (1965).
71 See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
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to an SPY, commingling could result either from the originator's interest in collections above the trigger point being deposited into a deposit account containing collections of the divisible
interest, or from the originator's and the SPV's respective interests in collections above the trigger point being deposited into
the same deposit account. For the reasons set forth below, Section 9-306 should be interpreted not to apply to commingled
cash collections of a divisible interest.
Section 9-306 of the U.C.C. governs a secured party's rights
on disposition of collateral. A central concept in Section 9-306 is
"proceeds" which is defined as "whatever is received upon the
... collection ... of collateral.,,72 Cash collections of a divisible interest therefore may constitute proceeds. The general rule
of Section 9-306 is that "a security interest continues in collateral . . . and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections" that are received by the originator instead of'
the SPV. 73 However, in the event of an "insolvency proceeding," such as a bankruptcy,74 a more restrictive rule applies
under Section 9-306(4). The SPV's divisible interest in cash
collections of the future payment stream would continue only in
specified categories of proceeds.75
Upon an originator's bankruptcy, an SPV's d,ivisible interest
in cash collections continues to the extent such collections are
deposited to a bank account of the originator containing only
collections of the divisible interest.76 Likewise, an SPV's divisible interest in cash collections continues to the extent such
collections are deposited into a deposit account owned mid controlled by the SPY and not by the originator. 77

72 U.C.C. § 9-306(1). The term "collateral" is defined in U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(c)
to include "accounts and chattel paper which have been sold." Therefore, proceeds would appear to include collections of a divisible interest in a future
payment stream consisting of "accounts" or "chattel paper." See id. § 9·106 and
§ 9-105(1)(b». Cf. supra note 11.
13 U.C.C. § 9-306(2). The term "security interest" used therein includes "any
interest of a buyer of accounts and chattel paper which is subject to Article 9."
U.C.C. § 1-201(37). Cf. id.
74 U.C.C. § 1-201(22).
75 Id. § 9-306(4).
76 Id. § 9-306(4)(a).
77 Id. § 9-105(1)(e) ("deposit account"). The commingling rule of U.C.C. § 9·
306(4) is intended to account for "proceeds received by a debtor." Id. § 9-306,
Official Comment No. 1. Collections received in the SPV's deposit account are
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Analysis becomes more difficult, however, if collections of the
SPV's divisible interest are deposited into an originator's bank
account containing funds of the originator. In that case, Section
9-306(4), by its terms, suggests that the SPV's interest would
be limited to an amount determined by a formula. Under this
formula, an SPV's divisible interest in commingled cash collections is limited to collections received by the originator within
10 days before the bankruptcy case is instituted less the sum. of
payments made to the SPY on account of such collections. The
Spy would lose its interest in cash collections received by the
originator prior to such 10-day-period and not paid over to the
SPY before the originator's bankruptcy.78
Where cash collections of the SPV's divisible interest in a
payment stream are commingled with general funds of the originator, the limitation in Section 9-306(4) would apply. Howev~r,
where cash collections of the SPV's divisible interest in a payment stream are commingled only with cash collections of the
originator's interest in the same payment stream, the limitation
in Section 9-306(4) should not apply.79
The purpose of the formula in Section 9-306(4) is to "substitute specific rules of identification for general principles of tracing" in situations where "proceeds have been commingled with
other funds."ao Would collections from the originator's retained

not proceeds received by the debtor. Therefore a practical solution to the commingling issue is to cause all collections of the future payment stream to be
deposited directly into the SPV's deposit account.
78 Therefore another practical solution would be to "sweep" collections at
least every 10 days from the originator to the SPV or to require all collections
to be deposited to an account of the SPV (instead of the originator's account).
An additional practical solution to the commingling issue can be referred to as
the "bootstrap approach." In note 47, supra, it was suggested that the originator
could cross-collateralize its indemnification obligations by pledging other assets,
perhaps including the originator's retained interest in the future payment
stream. Such cross-collateralization would give the SPV a security interest in
the originator's retained interest, thereby preventing commingling under U.C.C.
§ 9-306(4). See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
79 Such commingling may occur, for example, where the trigger point has
been reached and each additional dollar of collections is allocated to the SPV
according to its negotiated fixed percentage and to the originator according to
its retained interest.
80 See U.C.C. § 9-306, Official Comment No. 2(a), and U.C.C. § 9-306(4Xd)
(emphasis added). To the extent that the U.C.C. does not apply to the sale
because the payment stream sold is neither accounts nor chattel paper (supra
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interest in a payment stream in which the SPY has a divisible
interest constitute "other funds," or would they constitute proceeds? As discussed above, the term proceeds includes whatever
is received upon the collection of collateral. The term "collateral" means "the property subject to a security interest."81 Because a divisible interest creates an undivided interest in the
entire future payment stream, all of the cash collections of the
future payment stream should constitute proceeds. Accordingly,
cash collections of an SPV's divisible interest in a payment
stream that are commingled with cash collections of the originator's interest in the same payment stream are not commingled "with other funds" within the meaning of U.C.C. Section 9306(4).82
It also should be noted that the risk of commingling discussed above applies only to cash collections of the divisible
interest that are commingled with the originator's funds at the
time the originator first becomes subject to a bankruptcy case.
Cash collections received by the originator thereafter are not
subject to U.C.C. Section 9-306(4), which by its terms provides
that an interest continues in "identifiable cash proceeds in the
form of money which is neither commingled with other money
nor deposited in a deposit account prior to" an originator's
bankruptcy,83 and also continues in "identifiable cash proceeds
in the form of checks and the like which are not deposited in a
deposit account prior to" such bankruptcy.84

note 72), the common law general principles of tracing would appear to apply in
lieu of the formula in U.C.C. § 9-306(4). In addition, the Article 9 Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code
recently recommended to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute that subsection (4) of U.C.C. § 9306, including the formula and other special rules that apply to proceeds only
in the event of a debtor's insolvency proceedings, should be eliminated. Permanent Editorial Board Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Report,
Vol. 1, part III.C.15, at 122 (Dec. 1, 1992).
81 U.C.C. § 9-105(IXc) (including "accounts and chattel paper which have
been sold.").
82 If, of course, such collections are commingled with general funds of the
originator, that would raise a separate commingling concern under U.C.C. § 9306(4). In that case, the "bootstrap approach" discussed in supra note 78 could
be used.
83 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(b) (emphasis added).
84 Id. § 9-306(4Xc) (emphasis added); accord, In re Bumper Sales, Inc.
(Unsee. Credo Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp.), 20 B.C.D. 1212, 1216 (4th Cir.
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CONCLUSIONS

The sale of a divisible interest in a· future payment stream
can be structured in an economically viable manner as a true
sale. After the sale, the SPV's divisible interest in commingled
cash collections would not be impaired under bankruptcy or
commercial law.
Selling a divisible interest in a future payment stream can
revolutionize the development of structured finance and asset
securitization as means of raising capital. Not only will it allow
for a less cumbersome transactional structure than that which
is currently used, but the reduced transaction costs as well as
the economies of scale that can be achieved by multiple originators joining together in a single securitization transaction promise to expand the capital markets to now-excluded middle-market companies.85

1990).
85 To the extent small businesses and hospitals generate future payment
streams, they could benefit like rirlddle-market companies. Application of structured finance to the small business sector of the economy is an important
governmental policy goal. See SEC Release, supra note I, at 4.

